Rational security: modelling everyday password use by Duggan, Geoffrey B et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Duggan, GB, Johnson, H & Grawemeyer, B 2012, 'Rational security: modelling everyday password use',
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 70, no. 6, pp. 415-431.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2012.02.008
DOI:
10.1016/j.ijhcs.2012.02.008
Publication date:
2012
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of
Human-Computer Studies.  Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing,
corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document.
Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was
subsequently published in Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 70, 6, 2012.  DOI: 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2012.02.008
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
 1 
Running head: MODELLING PASSWORD USE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rational Security: Modelling Everyday Password Use 
 
Geoffrey B. Duggan, Hilary Johnson and Beate Grawemeyer 
 
University of Bath 
Bath, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to: Geoffrey Duggan,  
Department for Health, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK. Email:  
g.duggan@bath.ac.uk   
 2 
Abstract 
 
To inform the design of security policy, task models of password behaviour were 
constructed for different user groups – Computer Scientists, Administrative Staff and 
Students. These models identified internal and external constraints on user behaviour 
and the goals for password use within each group. Data were drawn from interviews 
and diaries of password use. Analyses indicated password security positively 
correlated with the sensitivity of the task, differences in frequency of password use 
were related to password security and patterns of password reuse were related to 
knowledge of security. Modelling revealed Computer Scientists viewed information 
security as part of their tasks and passwords provided a way of completing their work. 
By contrast, Admin and Student groups viewed passwords as a cost incurred when 
accessing the primary task. Differences between the models were related to 
differences in password security and used to suggest six recommendations for security 
officers to consider when setting password policy.  
 
Keywords: Password, Security, Task Modeling, Rationality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The examination of security from an economic perspective has demonstrated that the 
structure of incentives for both users and companies can explain many shortcomings 
in security policy development and user behaviour (e.g. Anderson, 2001). Economic 
agents will only improve security when this leads either to some perceived benefit or 
reduction in cost. Security initiatives can fail not just through technical difficulties but 
also through insufficient incentives for those that implement the policy. 
Consequently, to understand the impact of a security policy not only do we need to 
understand the incentives that apply to an organisation but also the incentives that 
apply at the level of individual users. Further, we also need to understand the way that 
users react to incentives. One method to achieve this is to supplement economic 
arguments with a consideration of psychological factors. The current article takes a 
step in this direction by drawing on the psychological literature to model users’ 
password security behaviour. 
 
The importance of focusing upon the user’s perspective has recently been illustrated 
by Herley (2009). He examined why user education has had limited effect upon the 
security of passwords, phishing site identification and SSL certificates. In short, the 
conclusion was that following much of the advice incurred considerable costs for the 
user while the benefits to the user were unclear or very small. For example, choosing 
long passwords that are not in the dictionary puts an additional memory load on the 
user but yields little benefit if accounts are locked out after a fixed number of failed 
logins. Further, even in instances (e.g. phishing) where the users’ bank details could 
be compromised, the proportion of users actually affected is very small and banks 
typically reimburse customers who are victims of fraud. The point is that, given the 
costs and benefits, many of the decisions to ignore security guidelines are rational 
from the perspective of the user. This contrasts with the common assumption that a 
failure to comply with security guidelines is irrational. 
 
Notwithstanding this analysis, there is however a large literature (see Kahneman, 
2003) demonstrating that people are susceptible to a range of biases and their 
behaviour is not always consistent with the principles of normative rationality 
assumed within some economic models (e.g. Muth, 1961). Herley (2009) explained 
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that whilst security behaviour may be understood as rational, nonetheless, it is not 
clear that users will necessarily improve the security of their behaviour even where 
there are clear incentives. Spiekermann et al. (2001) compared self-reported privacy 
preferences of users with their actual self-disclosing behaviour during an online 
shopping episode. Most people stated that privacy was important to them and were 
particularly concerned about the disclosure of private information. However, even the 
most privacy conscious individuals, who presumably had a large incentive not to 
reveal such information, freely answered personal questions during the shopping task.  
 
Apparent inconsistencies such as this and general biases in human behaviour can be 
explained as adaptations to limits imposed by time and by the external environment, 
along with the limited processing capability of the mind and competition between 
goals. These limits or constraints mean that the costs of calculating and following the 
optimal normative solution may not be justified by the benefits accrued. Thus, a more 
rational approach is to adopt alternative strategies that are adapted to the particular 
circumstances of the task, the environment and the individual (Anderson, 1990). In 
fact, following Howes et al. (2009), we argue that users are always rational insofar as 
they attempt to maximize “subjective expected utility” given the constraints on the 
cognitive architecture and the local task environment. This definition is an extension 
of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957) which suggests that people seek behaviours 
that are sufficient given the cognitive architecture and the local task environment.  
 
Herley (2009) stresses the rationality of users’ security behaviour by focusing on the 
objective costs and benefits for the individual user and illustrating the extent to which 
their behaviour is consistent with this objective evaluation. Because human cognition 
is extraordinarily adaptive (Anderson, 1990) we contend that maximizing subjective 
expected utility will often approximate behaviour based on an objective assessment of 
the costs and benefits. Where user security behaviour is not consistent with an 
objective cost-benefit assessment the discrepancy can be accounted for as error(s) in 
the users’ judgements of subjective expected utility or as some constraint. Our 
approach is to identify these differences by drawing from the psychological literature 
and by building user and task models.  
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The security behaviour that we focus on is the creation and use of passwords on an 
everyday basis. Although alternative techniques such as graphical passwords 
(Wiedenbeck et al., 2005) and the use of passphrases (Keith et al., 2007) potentially 
offer more secure methods of authentication, passwords are still the most popular 
measure for protecting information. Despite this, or perhaps because of this, many 
problems with password usage and examples of bad security practice have been 
observed (Florencio and Herley, 2007; 2010; Schneier, 2000; Zviran and Haga, 1999). 
 
Understanding the constraints that users operate under can help explain and/or help 
reduce the possible explanations for this bad practice. So, for example, limitations in 
memory capacity can constrain the length and number of passwords that users can 
remember (Vu et al., 2007). Similarly, an enforced security policy could provide a 
lower limit on the number of characters within a password or prevent the use of words 
from a dictionary. More subtly if, for example, users choose to write down a password 
rather than committing it to memory, then users must perceive the benefit for not 
having to remember a password to outweigh the possibility of, and costs associated 
with, an increased likelihood of a security breach. Perhaps because they consider it 
unlikely the service will be breached by someone reading the password, or perhaps a 
security breach will have little cost to the user. Of course, this may not reflect the 
actual costs and benefits for the user of writing down the password but it is the 
subjective judgement of the user that will determine their behaviour.  
 
2. Related Approaches to Security 
 
Some of the issues mentioned above have already been discussed within the context 
of the security domain. Most strikingly, in relation to privacy, Acquisti and 
Grossklags (2005) emphasized the importance of constraints and the need to consider 
rationality as bounded. They argued that although users reported growing concerns 
about privacy this did not necessarily translate into changes in behaviour. For 
example, 88% of people with high concerns about their name and address being 
stored in external databases still sign up for supermarket loyalty cards using their real 
identifying information. Acquisti and Grossklags contend that privacy decisions can 
be based on incomplete information and that decision making is subject to 
psychological constraints. 
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Our approach is aligned with Acquisti and Grossklags although, following Howes et 
al. (2009), we would also argue that within these constraints users are optimizers in 
that they will maximize subjective expected utility. More importantly though, the 
central aim of identifying and understanding constraints is common to both 
approaches. Here we address a different topic from privacy behaviour – the creation 
and use of passwords. Some constraints will be particular to the domain, most 
obviously those provided by the task and the environment. However, constraints 
related to the individual will also vary across contexts. For example, limitations in 
memory are probably more relevant to password use than privacy behaviour. In 
summary, this work extends many of the ideas from Acquisti and Grossklags to a 
different aspect of security behaviour and investigates the constraints within that 
particular domain. 
 
Another relevant approach is the “Compliance Budget” (Beautement and Sasse, 
2009). This emphasizes the importance of understanding the costs and benefits for the 
individual user and states that compliance occurs when the cost-benefit outcome of 
following a policy is greater than the cost-benefit outcome of not following it. 
Beautement and Sasse (2009) argue that the amount of effort users are prepared to 
expend on compliance is limited and that it is difficult to get users to comply with 
security policy once this budget is exceeded. We suggest that any effort expended on 
compliance must accrue some benefit that outweighs the costs in terms of subjective 
expected utility. However, this observation only has value insomuch as it leads to 
explanations of why users expend “compliance effort”. This paper models the specific 
case for password use but, in the general case, we speculate that some benefits for 
compliance effort could be perceptions of increased self-worth, avoidance of 
punishments for security breaches or the reduction of worry that a security breach will 
occur. 
 
Beautement and Sasse (2009) stress that the compliance budget is limited and, over 
time, users are increasingly less likely to follow additional security policies that 
require “compliance effort”. There are a number of potential explanations for this. 
Firstly, the cost of each additional security policy could be additive, thus increasing 
the overall cost and the extent to which other activities are compromised. Secondly, 
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the benefits associated with compliance may well be subject to diminishing marginal 
returns. For example, any increase in self-worth is unlikely to be directly proportional 
to the number of policies followed. Thirdly, each additional policy may also be 
perceived as predictive that there will be further future policies to follow. Fourthly, 
users may initially be more likely to explore or try new behaviours (i.e. complying 
with a guideline), as any possible benefit from the new behaviour can be enjoyed for 
longer. However, over time, the reward from exploring is reduced as at some point the 
user must focus on exploiting the current behaviours (Cohen et al., 2007). 
 
Cranor (2008) describes a system for reasoning about the human in the loop within 
secure systems. She developed her framework from the Communication-Human 
Information Processing model from the literature related to warnings (Wogalter, 
2006). Applying this framework to passwords led Cranor to the conclusion that the 
most critical failure is a failure in the capabilities of users, that is, people are not 
capable of remembering large numbers of policy-compliant passwords. However, the 
memory literature indicates that humans are capable of remembering vast amounts of 
information (Ericsson and Polson, 1988) and with sufficient rehearsal large numbers 
of passwords could potentially be remembered. Our approach stresses the judgement 
users make about the costs of correctly remembering large numbers of passwords 
(primarily time spent rehearsing) relative to the benefits accrued. Memory constraints 
are typically not an all-or-none capability and instead will predict the likelihood of 
failure given time spent rehearsing. (See also Komanduri et al., 2011, for evidence of 
the complex strategies users apply during password composition, presumably to 
accommodate different memory constraints.) We shall expand Cranor’s conclusion 
that memory constraints can affect password use by identifying characteristics of 
memory from the literature and predicting their effect on password use. 
 
3. Constraints on Password Security 
 
3.1. Memory Constraints 
 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the password as a security tool is dependent on the 
ability of the user to remember it and any failure to remember a password will 
increase the cost to the user of following the security policy. This cost could include 
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the set up costs of creating a new password, the social embarrassment of explaining 
the password has been forgotten and the delay or even failure to complete the task for 
which the password was required. These costs mean that users need to choose 
passwords that best exploit their memory resources.  
 
Two of the most basic findings from the memory literature are that recall for an item 
is related to the frequency with which it has been recalled and the time since it was 
last recalled (Ebbinghaus, 1885, 1964). More elaborately, Anderson and Schooler 
(1991) demonstrate that power functions describe both the rate of forgetting between 
presentation and test, and the improvement in learning due to practice. Therefore, 
passwords will be more easily recalled when they have been used recently and 
frequently. In everyday life, the frequency with which a password is used is 
determined by the number of times the user wants to access the password-controlled 
service or task. Nevertheless, because users choose which passwords are used for 
which tasks, they could adapt their choice of password to exploit the ease of recall for 
frequent and recent information.  
 
Our approach predicts that users will adapt their strategies to the local task 
environment (Anderson, 1990). Thus, if passwords that are rarely used are harder to 
remember then users are likely to adopt strategies that support the recall of 
infrequently used passwords. Similarly, there will be less need to adopt such 
strategies for frequently used passwords. Example strategies that would increase the 
memorability of a password are reusing the password for more than one service, 
writing down the password, constructing a password more closely related to the 
particular service (e.g. using “worklogin” as a password to login to an account at 
work) or constructing a password using a memorable word from the dictionary. All of 
these strategies reduce the security of the password, but as the difficulty of 
remembering the password increases, it becomes more costly for the user to maintain 
high levels of security. Therefore, we predict that users will rationally adapt to 
differences in frequency of password use and exploit these strategies for less 
frequently used passwords, resulting in less secure passwords. More secure passwords 
will be constructed for more frequently accessed services. Because users are 
maximizing subjective expected utility, we assess this prediction using participants’ 
estimates of password security rather than an objective measure of password security. 
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3.2. Knowledge Constraints 
 
Another potential constraint upon the security of passwords is the users’ knowledge 
of security appropriate behaviour. Users must be aware of a security procedure before 
they can use it to inform the construction of passwords. Set against the value of 
security knowledge, is the cost in terms of time and effort required to find and 
understand guidelines for the construction and use of passwords. Even if this cost is 
worthwhile, there are a whole range of different guidelines for password construction 
available, some of which contradict each other, meaning that the potential benefits 
from finding information about secure password use are unclear (Herley, 2009). More 
generally, determining the appropriate amount of information to acquire before 
decision-making is a difficult problem to resolve (Browne and Pitts, 2004). These 
factors mean that there are likely to be gaps in users’ knowledge about password 
security and there is evidence for this within the security literature (Hoonakker et al., 
2009; Sasse et al., 2001; Zviran and Haga, 1999). 
 
These gaps in security knowledge can directly affect behaviour, for example, Jensen 
et al. (2005) found that limitations in the understanding of privacy technology 
affected users’ behaviour online. In our study, we chose to investigate the extent to 
which differences in security knowledge affect the reuse of passwords. Reusing 
passwords for more than one account is a commonly reported strategy for reducing 
memory load that can compromise security (Florencio and Herley, 2007; Ives et al., 
2004; Shay et al., 2010). However, survey data from Gaw and Felten (2006) indicate 
that users are not always clear about the consequences of password reuse for 
password security. If there are differences in security knowledge then this could affect 
the overall level of password reuse and also the type of accounts for which passwords 
are shared. A rational account predicts that a greater awareness of the security 
consequences of password reuse will reduce the overall level of reuse and mean that 
users are less likely to reuse passwords for more sensitive services. 
 
3.3. Comparisons Between Groups of Users 
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To investigate the constraints that affect password use, we conducted a diary study of 
everyday password use. Grawemeyer and Johnson (2011) in a study concerned with 
the management of multiple passwords, report descriptive statistics from this study 
examining password use over the study period and the activities that required 
password activation in a typical day. They found that users often violated security 
guidelines and that many of these problems arose from the difficulty of managing a 
whole collection of passwords.  
 
In drawing conclusions about password use and misuse from the diary study sample, 
Grawemeyer and Johnson (2011) treated the users as a single group and did not focus 
upon individual differences between users. However, the users originated from three 
different job roles and here we exploit these real world differences to speculate about 
variations in password use. Security policies will often incorporate employees with 
different job roles and different user characteristics. Studying between-group 
differences in security behaviour enables policies to be developed that can be applied 
across different user groups or, where this is not possible, to suggest ways that a 
policy must be adapted according to the particular group or task. 
  
Furthermore, because the groups were relatively homogenous we can identify factors 
that may differ systematically between groups and could be subjected to further study 
using larger populations. Because these groups reflect real world distinctions any 
differences are likely to have greater applicability to other contexts of password use. 
Shay et al. (2010) gathered survey data on password use by faculty members and 
students and found the groups varied across a number of dimensions including 
instances of forgetting and strategies for remembering passwords.  
 
The three groups of users in this study were Students, Administrative Staff and 
Computer Scientists. These groups reflect differences in security knowledge and are 
representative of different groups that use passwords. We present tests of the 
predictions relating to memory, security knowledge and task structure for each of our 
user groups. These data along with interviews with members from each group were 
then used to build task models with the active involvement of users, describing 
password behaviour in each of the groups. These models are presented in Section 6 
 11 
and are an attempt to characterize the key constraints that affect password behaviour 
in different groups of users.  
 
4. Method 
 
Our approach was to combine a diary study of password authentications with a 
debrief interview for each password used. In addition, one randomly selected 
participant from each group individually collaborated with model building. This 
combination of methods enabled detailed recording of in situ behaviour along with a 
more elaborate understanding of the individual passwords themselves and the 
rationale behind their selection. The diaries were used both to provide information 
about participant behaviour and as a prompt for the debrief interviews around each 
password (Carter & Mankoff, 2005).  
 
The sample size of the dataset was not large (22 participants) but our approach 
employed multiple data gathering phases that yielded large amounts of quantitative 
(991 separate password authentications) and qualitative data (25 separate interviews). 
The decision to trade-off breadth of sample size for depth of detail was made with a 
view to maximizing the sophistication of the models of password behaviour in 
Section 6. This design strategy is not unusual within modelling approaches (e.g. 
Johnson and Hyde, 2003; Fischer, 2001) and complements the data gathering with 
vast numbers of participants that has already taken place within the password 
literature (e.g. Florencio and Herley, 2007, Bonneau and Preibusch, 2010).  
 
4.1. Participants 
 
Participants were recruited from a commercial technology organization (HP Labs) 
and a research intensive university (University of Bath). The study was conducted at 
the start of 2009 and participants received a £20 book token as compensation for their 
time. The three groups of participants were: 
Administrative staff. All 6 were female and worked in office administration roles 
providing support for non-security based tasks, 2 were educated in IT. One was in the 
age range 20-29, 2 in the age range 30-39, and 3 between 40 and 49 years. 
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Computer Scientists. Six computer scientists (2 female) working as either system 
engineers or researchers, all had an educational background in IT. One was in the age 
range 20-29, 2 in the age range 30-39, and 3 between 40 and 49 years. 
Students. Ten students (4 female) from a variety of educational backgrounds. Six 
were in the age range 20-29, 2 between 30-39, and 2 between 40-49 years of age 
 
4.2. Materials 
 
The diary consisted of a form that required information about the authentication 
process to be entered into boxes. In the order on which they were presented on the 
form the items were: the time of authentication; which password was used (the actual 
password was not divulged); location (home, office, mobile or other); activity before 
and after authentication; whether any hints were provided; the estimated time taken to 
authenticate; whether the authentication was successful or failed; if it failed, what the 
nature of the problem was for example, whether the participant knew if the failure 
originated from either mistyping (a typographical error) or misremembering, and what 
participants did in order to recover from failure (for example, try again or call the 
helpdesk).  
 
For the debrief interview a form was used to structure the interview around each 
password. This form assessed perceived sensitivity of the task accessed and the user’s 
estimate of the security of the password using 5 point Likert-style scales ranging from 
“very sensitive” to “not at all sensitive” for perceived task sensitivity and from 
“highly secure (uncrackable)” to “insecure (easy to guess)” for estimated security. It 
was important to collect subjective estimates of task sensitivity and password security 
as cognitively bounded rationality assumes users maximize subjective expected 
utility. The structure of the passwords was recorded by the participants themselves 
categorizing passwords, with respect to individual features such as length, inclusion 
of letters/digits/non-alphanumeric characters and whether the password included a 
word or common name. Also included were questions about how participants 
remembered the password and whether it was reused to access other services. 
 
4.3. Procedure 
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The diary study was conducted over a seven-day period in line with the 
recommendations of Rieman (1993). Throughout that time participants were required 
to go about their routine as normal and record in the diary every instance during the 
day or evening when they entered a password. Participants were instructed not to 
reveal their actual passwords at any point during the study. The aims of the study 
were explained including the purpose of maintaining the diary. 
 
Upon completion of the diary period a structured interview based around the debrief 
form was conducted. A separate form was completed for every password used during 
the diary period to ensure that all the password types were discussed fully. As well as 
the structured questions, participants were encouraged to expand upon their responses 
and elaborate upon any points arising from the diary entries. Prior to completing the 
diary participants were made aware that there would be a subsequent debrief 
interview to gather additional information about the characteristics of the passwords 
used, but not the actual passwords themselves. 
 
As well as the quantitative data arising from specific questions the debrief interviews 
provided rich qualitative data for each password used during the diary period. These 
data were expanded upon in a second modelling session with one representative 
chosen at random from each group. More detail about the modelling process is given 
in Section 6.1. 
 
5. Results 
 
The focus of our analyses and subsequent modelling was to develop an understanding 
of password security in each of the three groups. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, 
all analyses were conducted separately for each group. As in Inglesant and Sasse 
(2010), analyses focused on the password as the object of study. Passwords that were 
used by the same participant for more than one service were only included once in the 
dataset. There were 42 passwords in the Computer Scientist group, 74 passwords in 
the Student group and 38 passwords in the Admin group. 
 
All participants made diary entries across the whole period of the study and during the 
debrief interviews reported that, as far as they were aware, they had remembered to 
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record instances of password entry during the study period and that these recordings 
were made immediately after entering a password. 
 
5.1. Types of passwords created 
 
Firstly we describe the different types of passwords created. Each password was 
assigned to one of the following categories, i) single word or name (e.g. ‘Lucy’); ii) 
meaningful phrase (a simple sentence where the words are connected, e.g. 
‘WhoHasSentMeNewMail’); iii) abbreviation of a meaningful phrase (the initial 
letters of a sentence, e.g. the first letters of the sentence ‘Who has sent me new mail?’ 
would be `Whsmnm?’); iv) a meaningful combination of letters and numbers (e.g. 
initials and birthdays); v) a meaningful number pattern (e.g. ‘0845’); vi) random 
characters; or vii) some other pattern (a combination of e.g. words and letters).  
 
Table 1 shows the proportion of passwords in each group that fell into each of these 
categories. The distribution of proportions across categories varies greatly between 
the three groups. For example, the most common category of password is different in 
each of the groups. Also striking is that the proportion of passwords that were single 
words or names, was much higher in the Admin group. These passwords are more 
vulnerable to attack than less predictable character strings (Yan et al., 2004). In sum, 
these data suggest that the groups differ in the passwords they create and that these 
differences have implications for security. 
 
5.2. Estimated password security and perceived task sensitivity 
 
The data in Table 1 show that users do not select the most secure passwords possible 
for all services. Our rational approach assumes this is due to constraints relating to the 
user and the environment. To use this rational approach to help identify these 
constraints we must first establish whether users adapt the security of their password 
to the sensitivity of the service being accessed. 
 
Figure 1 shows the correlation between perceived task sensitivity and estimated 
security in each of the three user groups. The figure indicates that in all three groups 
the estimated security increased as the rated task sensitivity increased. Spearman’s ρ 
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correlations found this effect was reliable in all three groups: Computer Scientist, 
ρ(42) = .56, p < .001; Student, ρ(74) = .36, p = .002; Admin, ρ(38) = .50, p = .002. 
These correlations are relatively high particularly as they do not account for any other 
factors that might influence behaviour. This suggests that all three groups adapted 
their selection of passwords to the sensitivity of the task and that to some extent users 
are motivated by security considerations. 
 
The correlations are, however, far from perfect in all three groups and in particular for 
the Student group. Thus, there are other constraints influencing password use that are 
not accounted for in this simple analysis. The remainder of this section will be spent 
trying to identify and understand these constraints.  
 
One constraint that could explain the correlations is the password requirements that 
are enforced by the system. The correlations could simply reflect a tendency for more 
sensitive services to have stricter security policies. To address this, any passwords 
where participants reported a system-enforced policy were removed from the analysis 
(28%). This alteration did not change the pattern of results or statistical significance 
and the size of the correlation remained approximately the same in all three groups. 
 
5.3. Frequency of password use 
 
The literature on memory indicated that users will find it easier to recall passwords 
when they are used frequently. We predicted that, for more frequently used 
passwords, participants would be less likely to use strategies that aid recall but 
compromise security. Therefore, estimated security should be positively correlated 
with the frequency of password usage. The advantage for adapting strategy across 
passwords is dependent on the variance in frequency of password use. For groups 
with large differences in the frequency with which passwords are used there will be a 
greater advantage for adapting to the environment. 
 
The frequency with which passwords were used during the diary period was higher in 
the Computer Scientist group (M = 9.83, SD = 17.98) than in the Student group (M = 
4.55, SD = 4.97) and the Admin group (M = 5.08, SD = 6.21). A one way ANOVA 
between participants across all groups found this difference was significant, F(2, 151) 
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= 3.67, p = .03. Importantly, the variance in frequency of use was different between 
the three groups. The standard deviation was much higher in the Computer Scientist 
group indicating there was greater opportunity for that group to adapt the security of 
their passwords to the frequency of usage. 
 
The prediction that participants would find frequently used passwords easier to recall 
was supported by the data. Across all groups, participants reported that passwords 
used 10 times or more during the study were recalled “automatically” 83% of the 
time, whereas passwords used fewer than 10 times were recalled automatically 50% 
of the time. This difference between the groups was significant, χ2 (153) = 9.31, p = 
.002. The extent to which each group exploited this ease of recall for high frequency 
passwords was tested using a Spearman’s ρ correlation between estimated security 
and frequency of use.  
 
Figure 2 shows there was a significant positive correlation in the Computer Scientist 
group meaning that frequently used passwords had higher estimated security, ρ(42) = 
.30, p = .05. The figure also shows there was no clear relationship between frequency 
of use and estimated security in both the Student group, ρ(74) = -.12, and the Admin 
group, ρ(38) = -.08. These results suggest that participants adapted their password 
security in response to the structure of the task environment. In both the Student and 
Admin groups frequency of use did not vary greatly between passwords meaning 
there was little scope for improving the security of frequently used passwords. In 
contrast, there was greater variation in frequency of password use in the Computer 
Scientist group and these participants appeared to exploit this and construct more 
secure passwords for more frequently accessed services. 
 
5.4. Password Reuse 
 
The proportion of passwords that participants reported were reused for other accounts 
differed between the 3 groups. There were fewer passwords reused in the Computer 
Scientist group (43%) than in the Student group (64%) or the Admin group (68%). 
Chi-square analysis compared the total number of passwords that were reused or 
unique in each group and this found a significant difference between the groups, χ2(2) 
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= 6.55, p = .04. Passwords that reused only part of another password were treated as 
unique. 
 
One explanation for the difference in reuse between groups was that they reflected 
differences in knowledge of security procedures. This explanation was tested by 
comparing perceived task sensitivity for unique and reused passwords. A rational 
account predicts that an increased awareness of the negative consequences of reuse 
for security would lead participants to restrict reuse to passwords that provide access 
to less sensitive services. Therefore, we predict that in the Computer Scientist group 
perceived task sensitivity should be lower for reused passwords than for unique 
passwords. If the higher levels of reuse found in the Student and Admin groups were 
due to lower knowledge about factors that affect security, then we predict that these 
groups will be less likely to concentrate reuse upon less sensitive tasks. Therefore, for 
the Student and Admin groups there should be no difference or a small difference in 
the perceived task sensitivity for reused passwords and unique passwords. 
 
Figure 3 shows the mean perceived task sensitivity and standard error for unique 
passwords and reused passwords in each of the three groups. Mann-Whitney U tests 
compared the task sensitivity for unique and reused passwords within each of the 
three groups. Perceived task sensitivity was higher for unique passwords than for 
reused passwords in the Computer Scientist group, U(42) = 92.50, Z = -3.27, p = .001. 
There was no difference in perceived task sensitivity for unique and reused passwords 
in the Student group, U(74) = 600.50, Z = -.40, p = .69, or the Admin group, U(38) = 
155.50, Z = -.02, p = .99. Therefore, the Computer Scientists appeared to adapt their 
password reuse to the security risk – more sensitive services were more likely to be 
accessed with a unique password. By reusing passwords for less sensitive tasks the 
Computer Scientist group lessened the number of passwords that had to be 
remembered without increasing the security risk to the most sensitive tasks.  
 
Password reuse is one means of increasing the memorability of a password at the 
expense of security, therefore, reuse could be an adaptation to the frequency with 
which a password is used. This test of adaptation to frequency is not as strong as the 
correlation in Figure 2 because password reuse is only one of a number of strategies 
that could be used to trade-off security with memorability. Nonetheless, given that 
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reuse appeared to be adapted to the sensitivity of the task in the Computer Scientist 
group, it is interesting to compare the frequency of usage for reused passwords and 
for unique passwords. Because frequency of password use varied more in the 
Computer Scientist group and because security was better in the Computer Scientist 
group we would expect a greater difference in frequency of usage in the Computer 
Scientist group than in the Student or Admin groups.  
 
The means and standard errors for frequency of use for unique and reused passwords 
in each group are given in Figure 4. Mann-Whitney U tests compared task frequency 
for unique and reused passwords in each of the three groups. As predicted, in the 
Computer Scientist group unique passwords were used more frequently than reused 
passwords, but this difference was not reliable, U (42) = 187, Z = -.76, p = .45. For 
the Student and Admin groups, average usage of reused passwords was higher than 
for unique passwords. This difference was significant in the Student group, U (74) = 
447, Z = -2.16, p = .03, but was not significant in the Admin group, U (38) = 106.50, 
Z = -1.58, p = .12. Thus, there was some indication that the differences between 
groups in the frequency of password use may affect the pattern of reuse. That is, 
passwords that were frequently used were less likely to be reused in the Computer 
Scientist group which may have contributed to the lower overall levels of reuse in the 
Computer Scientist group. Although it should be stressed this result was not 
significant.  
 
The significantly higher frequency of use for reused passwords in the Student group 
indicates that some other constraint was influencing their behaviour. Also, the 
correlation in Figure 1 was smaller in the Student group than in the Computer 
Scientist or Admin groups. A speculative explanation for this pattern is that 
motivation towards security was lower in the Student group. This result and the 
general attempt to understand the relationship between reuse and task frequency 
illustrate the way that more complicated models of user security behaviour can be 
developed by considering multiple constraints in combination.  
 
6. Task Modelling 
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Having tested our hypotheses regarding password reuse and frequency of password 
use, we now seek to use these analyses along with the data from the diary study and 
the debrief interviews to construct models of password behaviour in each of the three 
groups. The general purpose of such modelling is to create an abstraction that 
succinctly describes the phenomena of interest. Such a representation enables the 
identification of relevant factors that determine behaviour, and crucially, enhances 
understanding of this behaviour. Making sense of behaviour in a format other than 
textual description supports comparison across models, the identification of strengths 
and weaknesses and highlights the absence of particular factors within a model. 
 
Models of users have been widely used within Human-Computer Interaction and task 
models have been used for training purposes and for generating and evaluating 
interface designs to support task behaviour (Allen, 1990; Johnson and Johnson, 1989; 
McCrickard et al., 2003). Therefore, this approach seems applicable to understanding 
enabling security tasks such as password creation, use and misuse. This will enable us 
to assess and outline clearly the different constraints that each individual user or user 
group is operating under. Further, the process of constructing the models should 
generate reflection from the user groups about their behaviour and perhaps lead to 
initial suggestions about how to change behaviour. For example, should specific 
constraints be relaxed or even removed and if so which constraints?  
 
During password creation and use, the user has a large amount of discretion over how 
they complete the task meaning that internal constraints are likely to be an important 
component of variance in behaviour between participants and groups. These internal 
constraints include knowledge of security policies and likelihood of threats as well as 
user motivation. Further internal constraints are knowledge about the task itself and 
the relative security of different types of password. Users must devise strategies for 
creating and maintaining passwords within these constraints, therefore knowledge of 
strategies is another important internal constraint. Table 2 provides a list of some 
internal constraints that affect password behaviour. 
 
There are also external constraints that can affect password behaviour. Table 3 shows 
external constraints grouped by the organization, the environment and the task. Some 
of these constraints are likely to be more or less important across the three different 
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groups. Our models will attempt to capture the way that users adapt to these 
differences in external constraints and the implications for password behaviour.  
 
The way that users respond to the constraints in Tables 2 and 3 will be determined by 
their knowledge of them and their knowledge of strategies for adapting to them. 
Therefore, our modelling approach is to represent password behaviour in terms of 
Task Knowledge Structures. An advantage of this approach is that, as well as 
representing the task itself, a TKS can show the underlying knowledge (or lack of 
knowledge) that each participant or group may have. Because users have a 
considerable discretion over their password behaviour we believe that differences in 
knowledge are likely to be an important determinant of any differences in password 
security. Although TKS has been successfully applied to user behaviour across a 
range of contexts (Johnson and Hyde, 2003; O’Neill et al., 1999; Wild et al., 2004), it 
has not been used within the security domain. Thus, a secondary aim for the 
modelling is to further develop the approach in the light of the data relating to 
passwords. 
 
6.1. Construction of TKS Models 
 
The construction of TKS models requires specific types of data about goals, objects, 
actions, procedures as object-action pairings, strategies etc. To extract this 
information specific questions were included within the debrief interview. For 
example, participants were asked how passwords were created, what procedures were 
followed and how passwords were passwords. These data from the debrief interview 
were combined with password diary data and used as the basis for the modelling. To 
check that these data sources were sufficient to construct TKS models and to test if 
anything was missing we conducted a second session with one participant from each 
group. 
 
During the second session, the researcher and the participant collaboratively 
constructed models of password creation and usage for that individual and for their 
group. Including the representation as part of the session encouraged reflection by the 
participants and also reduced the likelihood of inaccuracy and misinterpretation by the 
researcher. This second session lasted approximately an hour and included a number 
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of methods to aid model construction. For example, objects, actions and procedures 
from the diary and debrief were provided on separate pieces of paper and participants 
were asked to show how they were used. This was used to clarify aspects of the model 
such as which actions and objects were paired together (e.g. were passwords with 
symbols in them likely to be forgotten), which procedures were followed (e.g. was the 
likelihood of a security breach ever considered) and in what order were procedures 
completed (e.g. was the required password length checked before attempting to create 
a password). 
 
Participants were also asked to construct a goal structure to describe their behaviour 
and discuss any associated trade-offs between security and other priorities. Wherever 
possible participants were encouraged to construct the model on their own and 
volunteer information. When they were unable to do this the researcher assisted with 
prompts for more information or questions about the relationships between different 
aspects of the model.  
 
After constructing a TKS that described their own password behaviour, participants 
were then asked to construct a representative or composite TKS for their group (i.e. 
Admin, Computer Scientist or Student) and to comment on which elements from their 
own model would generalize to the group as a whole and any other factors that 
needed to be added or taken away. The models constructed during the session 
included a skeleton structure and the composite model for each group, which were 
constructed by adding information from the diary study and debrief interviews. 
Elements were only added to the composite model when they were reported by more 
than one member of the group or were deemed as representative of the group during 
an interview. 
 
There was no hard evidence for post hoc rationalizing of security behaviour during 
the interview. To minimize the likelihood of this it was emphasized to participants 
that we were interested in their actual security behaviour and reasoning rather than 
what they were “supposed to do”. During the interview comments and justifications 
were tied back to other aspects of their dataset to verify the reasoning reported and 
any apparent discrepancies were discussed. However, such discrepancies were 
unusual. 
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6.2. Admin TKS 
 
To illustrate the process of constructing TKS models for each of the groups we shall 
include the initial model constructed for a single participant from the Admin group 
before describing the composite model for the whole group. The TKS for the 
individual participant is given in Figure 5. A strong theme that emerged from the 
modelling was a clear separation between work and leisure. The participant had quite 
distinct strategies for each situation “… that’s only for my passwords at home. I’d 
never do that in work.” 
 
The participant considered work passwords were more likely to be attacked than 
leisure passwords and that a security breach at work would have serious consequences 
both for themselves and the organization. Accordingly, at work they used a password 
that they believed was less memorable but harder to guess/crack. This password was 
also not shared with anyone or written down. By contrast, almost all non-work 
activities were considered relatively low risk and the participant judged the passwords 
used for these activities to be more guessable and shared them in part or whole with 
other family members. Outside of work, no adjustment was made for any services 
perceived as less secure where passwords might be compromised. 
 
This participant also reused passwords extensively but kept the distinction between 
work and leisure tasks. All work tasks were completed using the same password but 
this password was never used for non-work tasks. They reported that this reuse was 
partially due to the frequency with which they had to interleave between tasks that 
required passwords. “I’m always jumping between one thing and another so it’s easier 
to just have the same password that I can keep using each time.” A password was 
chosen at random from three other passwords for almost all leisure tasks. These three 
passwords all contained the same stem.  
 
The participant was concerned about security at work and aware of some security 
guidelines – for example: “I have numbers as well as letters which makes it more 
difficult to guess”. Nonetheless, there were gaps in knowledge and limits in the extent 
to which guidelines were applied: “I never actually change it [a password used at 
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work] because I might not be able to remember the new one and I don’t want to have 
to go and explain I’ve forgotten it.” Ultimately, the participant was prepared to incur 
some cost at work as they perceived security to be important but they were not 
prepared to implement security guidelines when the cost interfered with their 
productivity at work. Outside of work the priority was to minimize the inconvenience 
of remembering passwords rather than the security of the services being accessed. 
 
To create a composite TKS for the whole Admin group we returned to the debrief and 
diary data and integrated that information with the individual TKS from Figure 5. 
This composite TKS is given in Figure 6, it shows that other group members had a 
strategy of using short passwords wherever possible and only extending them when 
the system required this. There was also sharing of passwords with colleagues as well 
as family members and a lower awareness of security guidelines by the group as a 
whole than for the individual who took part in the modelling session. Although the 
distinction between work and leisure was relevant to most group members, there was 
not the same clear divide in strategies applied and some passwords were reused across 
both contexts. Finally, other group members emphasized that the task environment 
included external interruptions and forced switches between tasks.  
 
6.3. Student TKS 
 
For brevity only the composite models are presented for the Student and Computer 
Scientist groups, the TKS for the Student group is given in Figure 7. There are a 
number of elements in common with the Admin group particularly within the 
strategies employed. Students also frequently reused passwords across services and 
did not change their password very often. However, there were also clear differences 
between the groups. 
 
Firstly, the distinction between work and leisure was not particularly relevant to most 
students and they freely shared passwords across services and did not adopt different 
strategies for password creation for work or non-work tasks. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the students were not actually employed by any organization, 
nevertheless, it is interesting to model behaviour when there is little responsibility to 
any external organization. The interviews found that many students perceived their 
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passwords to be under little risk of attack and that this decreased their willingness to 
create and maintain secure passwords.  
 
Another clear trend was that the students were on average more knowledgeable about 
security guidelines and procedures than members of the Admin group. Some not only 
understood password guidelines but were also aware of shortcomings with the 
guidelines and actively adjusted their behaviour on this basis. For example, one group 
member said “I’d never put anything really valuable online because you’ll never be 
able to stop someone hacking my computer and getting my password through 
keylogging”.  
 
Other noteworthy details from Figure 7 are the high degree of discretion over task 
interleaving (Payne et al., 2007). Participants were often able to choose what they 
worked on when and were not forced to frequently jump between password protected 
services. There was also a greater emphasis placed upon protecting privacy by this 
group “what I’d be really bothered about is if someone could access my Facebook 
account not work stuff.” Many of the services rated most sensitive were social 
networking sites. This may reflect a greater tendency to share more information 
online than a greater concern with privacy. 
 
6.4. Computer Scientist TKS 
 
The model for the Computer Scientist group in Figure 8 shows that this group were 
very knowledgeable about security guidelines for passwords. Interestingly, given their 
interest in computer science some group members chose to stay abreast of 
developments in password security as part of their job. “I usually know what’s going 
on in security because I’m interested in it anyway and I get sent updates and 
information all the time.” This also seemed to change their perception of the security 
task. Rather than viewing password protection as a cost that had to be borne, they 
viewed passwords as an asset – a way of protecting their information. “The important 
thing is that my stuff is safe. I want to have control over that.” and “Not having strong 
passwords is just stupid, they mean that I can do what I want. [That] I can do my job 
basically.”  
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The model also shows that the Computer Scientists were motivated to create secure 
passwords and, relative to the other groups, they believed there was a higher risk of a 
security breach and that this would have more serious consequences. This high 
knowledge about password security and high motivation translated into more 
sophisticated strategies being used for password generation for the sensitive services. 
Some participants applied these strategies across all passwords, however, hard-to-
remember passwords were typically only generated for the most sensitive services. 
 
There was also a high frequency of task interleaving in the Computer Scientist group. 
Some of this was under the participants’ control but the structure of the job also 
forced participants to enter some passwords frequently. Although passwords were 
reused across non-sensitive services, typically only part of a password was reused.  
 
6.5. Conclusions from modelling 
 
The goals for password behaviour differed importantly between the three groups. The 
models reflect differences in the importance attached to password security between 
groups. They also reflect differences in the way the goals were expressed and we 
argue that these differences in emphasis can have consequences for password 
behaviour. 
 
More specifically, the Computer Scientist group appeared to view security as part of 
the task they were completing. Thus, passwords enabled them to protect their work 
and thus complete their tasks. Accordingly, the benefits for secure passwords were 
most salient to this group and they were motivated to create passwords that minimized 
the likelihood of a security breach. In contrast, the Admin and Student groups viewed 
passwords as simply a cost that was incurred when completing their primary task. 
Therefore, many of their passwords were chosen to minimize the cost of remembering 
rather than for security reasons.  Where these participants considered security to be 
part of their job role (i.e. for the Admin group at work), then more secure passwords 
were constructed.  
 
Knowledge about password guidelines and security in general also differed between 
the three groups. The Computer Scientist group was the most knowledgeable 
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followed by the Student group and then the Admin group. The Computer Scientist 
group was also more likely to follow these guidelines and their password behaviour 
was most consistent with security recommendations. Interestingly, although the 
Admin group had the lowest security knowledge their work passwords were typically 
more secure than passwords in the Student group. Thus, security knowledge appeared 
to be an important factor in password security but it interacted with other variables 
such as motivation. 
 
The analyses in Section 5.4 found that in the Student and Admin groups password 
reuse was commonplace and this included passwords for sensitive services. The 
modelling process revealed that these groups were aware of the potential vulnerability 
caused by a compromised password that had been reused. However, the modelling 
also indicated that group members felt that most, if not all, of their accounts were at 
very low risk of being attacked. That is, although they often cared that the information 
was not accessed by others, they believed that this was unlikely so did not invest 
effort in creating and maintaining unique passwords. In general, the Computer 
Scientists believed there was a higher risk of accounts being compromised and were 
less prepared to reuse passwords for sensitive services. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
7.1. Summary 
 
A key idea underpinning this work is that users are rational – they maximize 
subjective expected utility (Howes et al., 2009). Given this premise, we tested the 
importance of password security to users by examining whether they adjusted the 
security of their passwords to the sensitivity of the service being accessed. Across 
three different groups of users, we found that password security correlated with the 
sensitivity of the service. These correlations also indicated that there were factors, or 
constraints, other than security that affected password behaviour. Further, the results 
showed differences between groups in the types of passwords used. Our aim was to 
identify these constraints for each of the user groups by drawing on the psychological 
literature and constructing task models.  
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The literature on memory led to the prediction that users would adapt to large 
differences in frequency of password use by constructing more secure passwords for 
more frequently accessed services. Within the Computer Scientist group there was 
high variance in frequency of password use and a positive correlation between 
frequency of use and estimated security. By contrast, frequency of use did not vary 
greatly between passwords in the Student and Admin groups and did not correlate 
with estimated security. 
 
Another potential constraint on password behaviour is task knowledge. We predicted 
that groups that were more knowledgeable about password security would reduce 
password reuse for more sensitive tasks relative to less sensitive tasks. This prediction 
was supported as perceived task sensitivity was higher for unique passwords than for 
reused passwords in the Computer Scientist group and there was no difference in 
perceived task sensitivity for unique and reused passwords in the Student and Admin 
groups.  
 
To better understand password behaviour we modeled each of the three groups, this 
process identified differences in task knowledge, procedures and strategies. These 
models also revealed the groups had different goals when creating and using 
passwords. The Computer Scientists viewed information security as part of their tasks 
and passwords provided a way of completing their work. By contrast, the Admin and 
Student groups viewed passwords as a cost incurred when accessing the primary task. 
For the Computer Scientist group increasing password security led to large gains in 
subjective expected utility, whereas for the Admin and Student groups minimizing the 
cost of remembering a password led to larger gains in subjective expected utility. 
Therefore, our data clearly illustrate the value in understanding both the constraints 
that each user or group operate under as well the goal(s) that they are trying to 
achieve. 
 
7.2. Applications to Security Policy 
 
Unsurprisingly, the models in Section 6 show that everyday password use is affected 
by a range of factors that interact in complex ways. To account for this complexity we 
avoid rigid recommendations that will not hold in many instances. Instead, following 
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Pawson and Tilley (1997), we point to key relationships between factors and their 
implications for password security. The aim is to support the expert security officer 
who can then apply those recommendations that are pertinent to their particular 
circumstances. Encouraging security officers to account for a large range of variables 
is likely to increase the complexity of their decisions. However, we hope that this 
could be offset by advances in decision support systems developed for security 
officers (e.g. Baldwin et al., 2011, Parkin et al., 2010). Recommendations: 
 
1. Account for users’ job roles. Both the quantitative results and the modelling 
demonstrated different approaches to password security from users with different job 
roles. Specific factors are considered in recommendations 2-6, but our results make 
the general point that different groups of users are likely to respond differently to 
security policies and that job role can predict some of this variance. Tailoring 
password policies to specific groups may not always be practical and where security 
officers are constructing a policy that will cut across many different job roles our 
results indicate they should set policy for the least security conscious groups. 
Otherwise, users may adopt nonsecure workarounds such as reuse and writing 
passwords down (see Figures 6 and 7). 
 
2. Adapt security policy to frequency of password use. For passwords used relatively 
frequently, users’ memory was more automatic and more secure passwords were 
constructed. Thus, users will find it easier to comply with stricter password policies 
for services that are accessed very frequently.  
 
3. Adapt security policy to perceived sensitivity of service accessed. Users created 
passwords that they considered more secure when they perceived the service to be 
sensitive. Further, the modelling interviews indicated all groups were more prepared 
to follow stricter security policies for sensitive services. Importantly, this depends on 
the perception of the user – services considered sensitive by an organization may not 
be considered sensitive by users. 
 
4. Incorporate security within the task or job role. The modelling indicated the 
Computer Scientist group were more willing to expend effort to create secure 
passwords and a crucial part of this willingness was the integration of security within 
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their job role or their task. Encouraging other users to be more like computer 
scientists is not a new idea within the security literature but our contribution is to 
emphasise the importance of treating security as part of the task (or job) rather than a 
hindrance to task performance. Thus, alterations to the interface or task design that 
integrate password entry within the primary task could increase user motivation to 
generate secure passwords. For example, information that is sensitive but not 
meaningful to the user could be integrated within more meaningful tasks that are 
password protected. 
 
5. Consider user motivation before imposing security demands. The task modelling 
found that unmotivated users simply ignored some security policies (i.e. creating 
unique passwords for every account). Imposing demands on unwilling users can be 
counterproductive as they will simply devise workarounds. This echoes the findings 
of Beautement and Sasse (2009) and suggests security officers should consider 
compliance with previous policies as a guide to user motivation. 
 
6. Emphasize the dangers of password reuse. As in other studies (i.e. Florencio and 
Herley, 2007), password reuse was a significant issue and quantitative analyses 
combined with modelling indicated that users’ knowledge affected the extent of 
password reuse. The modelling interviews found that when users inferred the value of 
following guidelines for themselves compliance was greater. This is consistent with 
the literature on behaviour change and techniques such as motivational interviewing 
(Miller and Rollnick, 2002) could be used to impart knowledge and support user-
initiated change rather than introducing top-down directives. 
 
These recommendations are flexible and rely on the expertise of the security officer 
implementing them. For example, where users have low previous compliance 
indicating low motivation but are accessing a very sensitive service then 
recommendations 3 and 5 make opposing predictions. Nonetheless, our results show 
that this reflects the reality of password use outside the laboratory. In these instances 
security officers must use their knowledge of the current situation combined with 
their previous experience. One value of this research is to signpost those variables that 
are likely to be important in different situations and to encourage security officers to 
engage with multiple factors and the interactions between them. 
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7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
 
As noted in Section 4 the sample size of the dataset was not large and this limits the 
generalizability of the findings reported here. However, given the lack of models of 
password behaviour, our aim was to produce a first step in capturing some of the 
detail of user behaviour across different groups. Smaller sample sizes and even case 
studies are often the richest source for theory development due to the detailed study 
these studies permit (Salkovskis, 2002). Here the approach has enabled the 
identification of constraints and generated hypotheses about the way these constraints 
interact. Nonetheless, having constructed these models there is now a need to validate 
and develop them using larger sample sizes and further studies. The reliance on self-
report measures means that we cannot eliminate the possibility of demand 
characteristics biasing their responses. Further studies could address this by including 
objective measures within task modelling, for example system logs of frequency of 
password entry. Another potential avenue is to construct an ideal model of password 
behaviour and contrast our models with this ideal to help identify gaps in password 
security that can be targeted through security policies. 
 
Our models show that password behaviour is dependent on multiple constraints that 
operate simultaneously. When constraints are combined, less intuitive and more 
sophisticated predictions can be inferred. Here we have only considered simple 
combinations of constraints but our hope is that further studies and subsequent task 
modelling would represent more complex interactions between constraints. Another 
ambition for subsequent modelling work is to provide input to mathematical models 
(Collinson et al., 2009; 2010) to generate economic predictions for adopting specific 
password policies. Such comprehensive modelling would allow different policies to 
be devised and user behaviour to be compared for each policy. 
 
A key advance for such modelling work would be the formal specification of a utility 
function for password behaviour. Our study showed the value of this as between 
group differences in goals were a key factor in explaining differences in password 
security. Users appear to trade-off gains in password security with costs in effort and 
time spent maintaining passwords. Because these trade-offs occur within different 
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internal and external constraints across passwords it is necessary to study all of these 
factors and the way that they interact to predict password behaviour. The models 
described here are a first attempt at this task. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Correlation between rated sensitivity of task and estimated security of the 
corresponding password in all three user groups. Larger data points denote more than 
one password with the same value ranging from smallest (1 password) to largest (12 
passwords). 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between estimated security and frequency of usage for each 
password in all three user groups. Larger data points denote more than one password 
with the same value ranging from smallest (1 password) to largest (11 passwords). 
 
Figure 3. Mean perceived task sensitivity for unique and reused passwords in all three 
user groups. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
Figure 4. Mean frequency of use for unique and reused passwords in all three user 
groups. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
Figure 5. Task Knowledge Structure (TKS) for password creation and use for an 
individual user in the Admin group. 
 
Figure 6. Task Knowledge Structure (TKS) for password creation and use for the 
Admin group. 
 
Figure 7. Task Knowledge Structure (TKS) for password creation and use for the 
Student group. 
 
Figure 8. Task Knowledge Structure (TKS) for password creation and use for the 
Computer Scientist group. 
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 Comp. Scientist Student Admin 
Single word/name .20 .06 .63 
Meaningful phrase 0 .14 .06 
Abbreviation meaningful phrase .43 .25 .17 
Meaningful letters and numbers .11 .06 0 
Number pattern .11 .01 .11 
Random .09 .17 0 
Other pattern .06 .28 .03 
 
Table 1. Proportion of different password types in each of the three user groups. 
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User 
Motivation 
General 
Knowledge 
Task Knowledge 
 
Taxonomic structure Goal structure 
Attitude towards 
company 
Status within 
company 
Personal 
characteristics, 
e.g. laziness 
 
Awareness of 
threats and 
likelihood of 
attacks 
Knowledge of 
previous security 
policy and 
breaches 
Accountability of 
security breach 
Personal and 
company security 
history 
Password elements: 
-Length 
-Type of characters, 
i.e. letters, numbers, 
symbols 
-Structure, i.e. words 
from a dictionary, 
capitalization 
Composition of user 
ID 
Relationship between 
password and user 
ID 
Reason for password 
Factors that affect 
security of 
password 
Other passwords in 
use 
Relationship to other 
passwords in use 
Strategies 
-Reuse all of 
password 
-Reuse part of 
password 
-Offload to 
environment 
-Share with others 
 
 
Table 2. Constraints internal to the user that affect password security 
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Organisation Environment Task 
Culture of organisation 
General security policy 
including after breaches 
Specific password policy 
Clarity and availability of 
rules 
Extent to which rules are 
enforced or voluntarily 
applied 
 
Job role – responsibilities 
and level of control 
Social aspects of 
relationships with 
colleagues 
Time pressure 
Location 
Resources available 
Extent of collaboration 
and interdependencies 
with others 
 
Importance of task 
Frequency of task 
execution 
Extent of interleaving 
with other tasks 
Type of task – work or 
leisure 
Availability of 
alternative tasks 
Tasks completed before 
and after current task 
Number of similar tasks 
requiring passwords 
 
Table 3. Constraints external to the user that affect password security 
  
 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Correlation between rated sensitivity of task and estimated security of the corresponding password in all three user groups. Larger data 
points denote more than one password with the same value ranging from smallest (1 password) to largest (12 passwords). 
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Figure 2. Correlation between estimated security and frequency of usage for each password in all three user groups. Larger data points denote 
more than one password with the same value ranging from smallest (1 password) to largest (11 passwords). 
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Figure 3. Mean task sensitivity for unique and reused passwords in all three user groups. Error bars are standard errors. 
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Figure 4. Mean frequency of use for unique and reused passwords in all three user groups. Error bars are standard errors. 
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Figure 5
Context 
 
Many interruptions. 
 
High task interleaving. 
 
Resources or services 
are often shared. 
 
High responsibility at 
work for security 
breach. 
 
Declarative Knowledge 
 
Low awareness of security constraints and 
consequences of breaches. 
Reuse is acceptable across sensitive and non-
sensitive services and frequent and 
nonfrequent services. 
Aware that work passwords can be cracked 
Low awareness of likelihood that non-work 
passwords can be attacked. 
Acceptable to share passwords with family. 
Strategies for creation of secure password 
Reuse entire password. 
Reuse part of password. 
Abbreviate meaningful phrase for work password. 
No need to change password. 
Procedures 
1. Identify need for new password. 
2. Determine whether work or leisure task. 
3. If work task then use work password, for all other 
tasks select 1 of 3 passwords. 
4. If service does not allow password, select 1 of 
other 2 passwords. 
Actions 
Type in. 
Misremember. 
Mistype. 
Try similar passwords. 
Contact helpdesk 
Password features 
Letters. 
Words. 
Numbers. 
TKS 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
 
Detailed declarative knowledge 
 
Subgoals 
Enable access to services required for work. 
Protect sensitive information. 
Avoid cost of asking for new password. 
 
Goal – Support job performance. 
 
Goal – Access non-work services with minimal 
effort. 
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Figure 6 
Context 
 
Many interruptions. 
 
Little user control over 
frequent deadlines. 
 
Scope of tasks high 
(many different tasks). 
 
High task interleaving. 
 
Resources or services are 
often shared. 
 
Some responsibility at 
work for security 
breach. 
 
Declarative Knowledge 
 
Low awareness of security constraints and 
consequences of breaches. 
Dictionary words can be a secure password. 
Reuse is acceptable across sensitive and non-
sensitive services and frequent and 
nonfrequent services. 
Low awareness of possibility that passwords can 
cracked. 
Acceptable to share passwords with family and 
some colleagues. 
Strategies for creation of secure password 
Reuse entire password. 
Reuse part of password. 
Share across sensitive and non-sensitive 
services. 
Create longer password and write down. 
Create longer password and share with 1 or 
more parties. 
No need to change password. 
Procedures 
1. Identify need for new password. 
2. Use same password or change an existing password slightly – add extra letters. 
3. Either write down and share new password or choose to access helpdesk. 
4. If service is sensitive then create a longer password. 
Actions 
Type in. 
Forget completely. 
Misremember. 
Mistype. 
Mismatch to user ID. 
Access written down 
password. 
Try similar passwords. 
Ask third party. 
Contact helpdesk. 
Password features 
Letters. 
Words. 
Numbers. 
TKS 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
 
Detailed declarative knowledge 
 
Subgoals 
Enable access to services required for work. 
Protect sensitive information. 
Avoid cost of asking for new password. 
 
Goal – Support job performance. 
 
Goal – Access non-work services with minima 
Enable access to services required for work. 
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Figure 7  
Context 
 
Many tasks under 
users’ control. 
 
Large amount of 
control over 
when tasks 
completed. 
 
Low external 
responsibility 
to maintain 
security. 
 
Declarative Knowledge 
 
Aware of some security constraints. 
Knowledge of construction of “secure” 
passwords – value of random character 
strings. 
Knowledge of why passwords are needed 
and their potential uses. 
Aware of some risks of password reuse. 
Sceptical of some password guidelines. 
Considers personal passwords to be under 
low risk of attack. 
 
Strategies for creation of secure password 
Reuse entire password. 
Share across sensitive and non-sensitive 
services. 
Memorize random combination letters. 
Abbreviate meaningful phrase/object. 
 
Procedures 
1. Identify need for new password. 
2. For service containing private information 
create new password with random letters or 
abbreviation of meaningful phrase. 
3. For other services reuse an old password. 
4. Match passwords to enforcement rules. 
Password features 
Letters. 
Numbers. 
 
TKS 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
 
Detailed declarative knowledge 
 
Goals  
Enable access to services. 
Protect privacy. 
 
Actions 
Type in. 
Forget completely. 
Misremember. 
Mistype. 
Mismatch to user ID. 
Access written down 
password. 
Try similar passwords. 
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Figure 8. 
 
 
Context 
 
Many tasks under 
users’ control. 
 
Task interleaving 
often under user 
control. 
 
Some tasks are 
undertaken very 
frequently. 
 
High responsibility 
for security 
breach. 
Declarative Knowledge 
 
Aware of many security constraints. 
Knowledge of construction of “secure” 
passwords – letters, words, symbols, numbers, 
capitals. 
Knowledge of why passwords are needed and 
their potential uses. 
Knowledge of what affects the sensitivity of a 
service and links the sensitivity of service to 
security of password. 
Aware of risks of password reuse. 
Understands need to change password. 
 
Strategies for creation of secure password 
Abbreviate meaningful phrase/object. 
Substitute symbols for letters. 
Use acronyms. 
Only reuse passwords across nonsensitive 
services and reuse part of password. 
Match security to sensitivity. 
 
Procedures 
1. Identify need for new password. 
2. Consider sensitivity and frequency of service. 
3. For sensitive frequent service, create new unique 
password of symbols, letters, numbers and use 
acronyms. 
4. For nonsensitive, infrequent service create new 
password by reusing parts of existing password. 
5. Match passwords to enforcement rules. 
 
Actions 
Type in. 
Forget completely. 
Misremember. 
Mistype. 
Mismatch to user ID. 
Password features 
Letters. 
Numbers. 
Words. 
Symbols. 
 
TKS 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
 
Detailed declarative knowledge 
 
Subgoals 
Create passwords that are difficult to crack. 
Prioritize passwords for services with: 
-sensitive information. 
-high risk of attack. 
Minimize disruption to general productivity. 
 
Goal - Complete tasks securely. 
 
